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ARE FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC STATE ACTORS?
STATE ACTION, DUE PROCESS, AND NONJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE†
ABSTRACT
This Comment considers whether the federal conservatorship of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac transformed these entities into state actors subject to
constitutional constraints. In particular, it analyzes whether Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac must provide homeowners with due process—namely notice and
an opportunity to be heard—when they initiate nonjudicial foreclosures.
This Comment surveys and applies five state action tests set forth by the
Supreme Court to determine whether nonjudicial foreclosures initiated by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must satisfy due process requirements.
Application of the state action tests from Lebron and Brentwood Academy
most persuasively suggest that nonjudicial foreclosures initiated by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac must satisfy due process requirements. Although a
number of federal district courts and one circuit court of appeals hold that the
test embodied by Lebron requires permanent government control to render the
entity a state actor, this Comment argues that indefinite control—exhibited by
the federal conservatorship—suffices. Alternatively, this Comment argues that
pervasive federal entwinement with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac renders
their conduct state action under the test set forth in Brentwood Academy,
notwithstanding satisfaction of the Lebron test.
To the author’s knowledge, no case or academic work has explicitly
applied the entwinement test to post-conservatorship Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. This Comment concludes that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are state
actors under the entwinement test. However, because courts are reluctant to
find state action where the government regulates the secondary mortgage
market, it remains unlikely that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will be required
to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to homeowners facing
nonjudicial foreclosure.

† This Comment won the 2015 ABA Forum on Affordable Housing & Community Development Law
Student Writing Competition.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to the mortgage crisis of 2008, Congress passed the Housing
and Economic Recovery Act (HERA).1 HERA created the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent government agency tasked with the
regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.2 HERA authorized the Director of
the FHFA to appoint the FHFA as conservator of Fannie and Freddie3 and, on
September 7, 2008, the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury announced that both
Fannie and Freddie had been taken into federal conservatorship.4 As
conservator, the FHFA “assumed the power of the board of directors and
management of both corporations.”5
The conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie marked a dramatic corporate
restructuring that raises potentially great constitutional questions. One such
question is whether the “deprivatization” of Fannie and Freddie transformed
these entities into state actors, such that they are subject to constitutional
constraints.6 This question is particularly relevant in the context of nonjudicial
foreclosure because state actors, unlike private lenders, are required to afford
due process to homeowners.7 Such nonjudicial foreclosure is the predominant
method of foreclosure in a majority of states.8 Considering both that Fannie
1

Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 4511(a), (b)(2) (2008). The corporate names of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHMLC). See infra Part III. For present purposes, “Fannie” and “Freddie” refer to FNMA and FHMLC
respectively.
3 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(3)(A) (2012).
4 Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Treasury Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement on
Treasury & Fed. Housing Fin. Agency Action to Protect Fin. Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx.
5 GRANT S. NELSON, DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHART & R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, REAL
ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 691 (8th ed. 2009).
6 A number of scholars have addressed this question. See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 690–92;
Florence Wagman Roisman, Protecting Homeowners from Non-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgages Held by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 43 REAL ESTATE L.J. 125, 127–29 (2014); Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the
Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583,
615–16 (2010); FRANK S. ALEXANDER ET AL., GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND FORECLOSURE LAW
§ 13.2(b) (database updated Oct. 2014).
7 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993) (“[A
homeowner’s] right to maintain control over his home . . . is a private interest of historic and continuing
importance.”); ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.2(a) (“The due process requirements of the United
States Constitution are applicable only if there is a deprivation of property as a result of state or federal
action.”).
8 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.11, at 600–01 (5th ed.
2007); NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 641 (nonjudicial foreclosure permitted in about 60% of jurisdictions);
2
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and Freddie own or guarantee over half the mortgages in the United States9 and
that millions of homeowners have lost—and will continue to lose—their
homes through foreclosure,10 answering this state action11 question is more
than mental gymnastics. The answer, in turn, will determine the due process
rights of millions of homeowners.
Most scholars considering whether Fannie and Freddie are state actors have
applied the test announced by the Supreme Court in Lebron v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp.12 to determine whether, post-conservatorship,
Fannie and Freddie are “part of the government.”13 Under the Lebron test, an
entity is a state actor if two prongs are satisfied: government purpose and
government control.14 Courts that have considered this issue in recent years
have almost unanimously found that Fannie and Freddie do not satisfy the
Lebron test.15 Although there is consensus that Fannie and Freddie satisfy the
first prong of the Lebron test because they were created for the furtherance of
government objectives,16 to date, courts have held that the entities fail the
second, government-control prong because the FHFA conservatorship is not
permanent.17
Alternatively, Professor Florence Roisman contends that the proper test is a
bright-line rule: “[I]f ‘a direct federal instrumentality’ is the foreclosing

Frank Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31
REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 350 (2012).
9 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2012, at 6 (2013), http://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/
Reports/ReportDocuments/2012_AnnualReportToCongress_508.pdf.
10 Roisman, supra note 6, at 126.
11 For present purposes, “state action” also refers to federal action. See infra note 63.
12 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
13 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 692; Nelson, supra note 6, at 616; ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note
6, § 13.2(b) (“[B]oth elements of the Lebron test for a federal instrumentality appear to be met for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.”).
14 See infra note 76.
15 Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 168 (6th Cir. 2014); Narra v. Fannie Mae, No.
2:13-cv-12282, 2014 WL 505571, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2014); Kapla v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (In re
Kapla), No. 11-68878, 2014 WL 346019, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2014); Hermiz v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp. (In re Hermiz), No. 13-11199, 2013 WL 3353928, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 2013); May v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., No. 4:11-3516, 2013 WL 3207511, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2013); Bernard v. Fed. Nat.
Mortg. Ass’n, No. 12-14680, 2013 WL 1282016, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2013); Fannie Mae v. Mandry,
No. 12-13236, 2013 WL 687056, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2013); Lopez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 920 F. Supp.
2d 798, 801 (W.D. Mich. 2013); Syriani v. Freddie Mac Multiclass Certificates, Series 3365, No. CV
12-3035-JFW, 2012 WL 6200251, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2012); Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87,
96 (D.D.C. 2012).
16 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397–400 (1995).
17 See infra note 86.
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mortgagee, then the requisite federal action exists, and a court will apply
[F]ifth [A]mendment due process standards to test the constitutionality of the
foreclosure.”18 But courts are not likely to find Fannie and Freddie to be state
actors by application of the bright-line rule either. Application of the brightline rule19 to the FHFA presupposes that the FHFA is the foreclosing
mortgagee when Fannie and Freddie foreclose on homes. Although the FHFA
“conduct[s] all business of the regulated entit[ies],”20 the FHFA does not
directly foreclose upon mortgages. The relationship between the FHFA and the
foreclosure action is more attenuated: the FHFA operates Fannie and Freddie
under conservatorship; Fannie and Freddie initiate foreclosures; and servicers,
who “usually are the originating lenders,” effect foreclosures as agents of
Fannie and Freddie.21 Because the FHFA is not the directly foreclosing entity,
determining that the FHFA is a state actor would not necessarily render as state
action the conduct of private servicers foreclosing on behalf of Fannie and
Freddie. In other words, a court might consider the FHFA a state actor but not
impute the actions of Fannie’s and Freddie’s agents to the FHFA. Without
addressing whether action by Fannie and Freddie is action by the FHFA, this
Comment argues that the entities themselves are state actors.
This Comment proposes a novel approach to determine whether Fannie and
Freddie are state actors. It applies the entanglement state action exception22 to
Fannie and Freddie, arguing that even if both are private entities, their
operation under federal conservatorship constitutes sufficient government
involvement to render Fannie’s and Freddie’s conduct “fairly attributable to
the state.”23 This entanglement analysis eschews both the Lebron test and the
bright-line rule because it does not consider whether the entities are “part of
the government,” but instead considers the extent of government involvement
with Fannie’s and Freddie’s conduct.24

18 Roisman, supra note 6, at 174–75 (citing NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at 689). Because Fannie
and Freddie are operated under FHFA conservatorship, and because the FHFA is a direct government
instrumentality, Professor Roisman concludes that foreclosures by Fannie and Freddie satisfy the bright-line
rule. Moreover, Professor Roisman argues that foreclosures by Fannie and Freddie would constitute state
action even if the Lebron test were proper. Id. at 179.
19 Id.
20 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(B)(i), (iii) (2012).
21 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3; Roisman, supra note 6, at 126–27.
22 For present purposes, “entanglement” includes the “entwinement” test embodied by Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 297 (2001).
23 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
24 See infra note 91.
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This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses the nature of
nonjudicial foreclosure and its due process implications. Part II provides
background to the state action doctrine and surveys Lebron and the
entanglement line of cases for tests to determine whether Fannie and Freddie
are state actors. Part III discusses Fannie and Freddie before and after
conservatorship and analyzes the nature and degree of governmental
involvement under the FHFA conservatorship. Part IV applies the state action
analyses to Fannie and Freddie and concludes that both entities are state actors
under the Lebron and entanglement tests.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
This Part describes foreclosure, the process by which a mortgagee initiates
the sale of real property standing as security for an underlying debt.25 Next, it
contrasts the two most common types of foreclosure in the United States.
Finally, it considers state action and the requirements of due process in the
context of judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure.
A. Foreclosure Generally
A mortgage is the “transfer by a debtor-mortgagor to a creditor-mortgagee
of a real estate interest, to be held as security for the performance of an
obligation.”26 This obligation is typically the payment of a debt evinced by a
promissory note.27 In the event of default by the mortgagor, a mortgagee may
protect its financial interest by electing to accelerate, declaring the whole
amount of the mortgage debt due and payable.28 When a mortgagor fails to
tender payment to redeem the mortgage, a foreclosure sale ensues, and the
proceeds of the sale are applied to the outstanding mortgage debt held by the
mortgagee.29

25

ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.1.
NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 100. What is colloquially called a mortgage consists of two
documents: the promissory note, which evinces the mortgagor’s obligation, and the security instrument. The
security instrument goes by different names in different jurisdictions. For present purposes, “mortgage” refers
also to “deed of trust,” the security instrument used most commonly in power of sale jurisdictions. NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 7.19, at 633.
27 NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 100.
28 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 7.6, at 580.
29 Id. § 7.11, at 600.
26
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B. Judicial and Nonjudicial Foreclosure
The two most common types of foreclosure in the United States are judicial
and nonjudicial, or “power of sale,” foreclosure.30 Judicial foreclosure is
available in every jurisdiction.31 As the name suggests, this mechanism
requires a judge to enter an order authorizing the sale of the underlying
security property. Compared to nonjudicial foreclosure, judicial foreclosure is
complicated and time-consuming. It requires filing a foreclosure bill of
complaint; service of process; a hearing; judgment; notice of sale to the
mortgagor; sale and issuance of a certificate of sale; judicial determination of
claimants’ right to surplus; possible redemptions from foreclosure; and
possible entry of a decree for a deficiency.32
In contrast, nonjudicial foreclosure—permitted in approximately 60% of
jurisdictions in the United States—does not typically involve judicial
intervention.33 After some degree of notice prescribed by state statute, property
is sold at a public sale conducted by the mortgagee, a public official, or some
other third party.34 Because nonjudicial foreclosure is cheaper and faster than
judicial foreclosure, it has become the predominant method of foreclosure in
jurisdictions that permit it.35 But increased expediency is not without cost:
because nonjudicial foreclosure eschews the procedural requirements of
judicial foreclosure, it raises federal constitutional due process concerns.36
C. Due Process and Foreclosure
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution prohibit the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.37 Due
process typically requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.38 Such notice
30
31

601.

Id. §§ 7.11, 7.19.
Judicial foreclosure is the exclusive method of foreclosure in at least 40% of the states. Id. § 7.11, at

32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1997); NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 7.11, at 601.
33 Jack Jones & J. Michael Ivens, Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee: A Section 1983 Trap, 51
TENN. L. REV. 279, 293–94 (1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1997).
34 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, §§ 7.11, 7.19.
35 Id. Such foreclosure sales are authorized because, in a deed under power of sale, the mortgagor
appoints the mortgagee as its attorney-in-fact for purposes of conducting foreclosure. ALEXANDER ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 8:9.
36 See Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632, 634 (1926).
37 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
38 See Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
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must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action.”39 The timing and
particularities of the hearing requirement depend on the severity of the
deprivation at stake.40 A homeowner’s equitable or legal title to real property,
the subject of a foreclosure action, has long been recognized as a
constitutionally protected property interest.41 Given the severity of
foreclosure—loss of the mortgagor’s home—due process in the foreclosure
context requires the opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing.42
Judicial foreclosure, properly conducted, satisfies due process requirements
because it requires service of process and a hearing.43 In contrast, the notice
requirements of nonjudicial foreclosure are almost universally less demanding
than those of judicial foreclosure,44 and all but two power of sale jurisdictions
permit foreclosure sale without an opportunity for a hearing.45 As such,
nonjudicial foreclosure raises due process concerns not implicated by judicial
foreclosure.46 The constitutional requirements of due process, however, only
apply to a mortgagee upon a finding of state action.47

39

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Although Mullane considered
sufficiency of notice to beneficiaries of a common trust fund, its holding extends to the mortgage context. See,
e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 797 (1984) (“[U]nless the mortgagee is not
reasonably identifiable, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the mandate of Mullane.”).
40 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1970) (concluding that a hearing was required before the
deprivation of a property interest).
41 Roisman, supra note 6, at 142, 142 n.88 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510
U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993) (stating that a homeowner’s “right to maintain control over his home . . . is a private
interest of historic and continuing importance”)).
42 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 (1972) (requiring judicial hearing prior to prejudgment garnishment
of chattel security). “If Fuentes requires some type of hearing before chattel security may be seized even
temporarily, surely it may be argued that the due process clause does not permit the permanent taking of real
estate security by passage of title with no opportunity for a hearing at all.” NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8,
§ 7.25, at 676.
43 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1997) (“A typical
proceeding entails . . . service of the complaint on the owner . . . [and] a judicial hearing.”).
44 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-13-141, 44-14-162, -162.2 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55
(2014) (requiring notice of publication in the form of newspaper advertisement).
45 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at 634, 634 n.7.
46 Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632, 635–36 (1926).
47 See, e.g., Pappas v. E. Sav. Bank, 911 A.2d 1230, 1237 (D.C. 2006) (holding that nonjudicial
foreclosure absent governmental action is not restricted by due process).
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D. The State Action Requirement
On its face, the Constitution only protects individual rights and liberties
from action taken by the government.48 Thus, even if a state power of sale
statute does not satisfy due process requirements, state action must be found
before constitutional protections apply.49 Although state law authorizes and
prescribes requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure,50 the legislative
authorization of nonjudicial foreclosure, without more, is not sufficient to
trigger due process requirements.51 Where the foreclosing party is a
governmental actor, state action is implicated and due process requirements
must be met.52 Where governmental agencies or entities are indirectly
involved—where they guarantee or subsidize a mortgage containing
authorization for power of sale foreclosure—cases are less clear.53 Because
Fannie and Freddie are publicly owned but federally chartered,54 the state
action analysis is especially nuanced. The following Part considers six state
action analyses that will be applied to Fannie and Freddie in Part IV.
II. STATE ACTION ANALYSES FOR GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
AND PRIVATE ACTORS
The threshold question in assessing a constitutional claim is whether the
action at issue constitutes “state action.”55 Courts have long distinguished
between “deprivation by the State, subject to [constitutional] scrutiny under its
provisions, and private conduct . . . against which the Fourteenth [and Fifth]

48

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 519 (4th ed. 2011).
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at 682.
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1997) (“[P]ower of
sale . . . . is generally available only where authorized by statute and the mortgage instrument.”). See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 35-10-12 (West 2015) (prescribing requirements for power of sale foreclosure); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 44-14-180 (West 2015) (prescribing requirements for power of sale foreclosure).
51 See Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632, 636 (1926); Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real
Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 367 (1993).
52 See, e.g., Johnson v. Dep’t of Agric., 734 F.2d 774 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying due process
requirements to foreclosure proceedings initiated by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)); Lehner v.
United States, 685 F.2d 1187, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying due process requirements to foreclosure
initiated by HUD).
53 ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.2(b).
54 See infra Part III.
55 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 348 n.2 (1974) (“Because of our conclusion on the
threshold question of state action, we do not reach questions relating to the existence of a property interest or
of what procedural guarantees the Fourteenth Amendment would require if a property interest were found to
exist.”).
49
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Amendment[s] offer[] no shield.”56 However, exceptions to the state action
requirement exist, such that certain kinds of private conduct are attributable to
the government and must comply with constitutional safeguards.57
In determining whether state action is implicated in a particular case, it is
useful to distinguish the actor charged with the deprivation from the nature of
the activity causing the deprivation.58 Identifying the actor as a governmental
actor will almost always implicate state action, regardless of the nature of the
activity.59 Likewise, identifying the activity as “traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State” will almost always implicate state action, even if a
private actor performs the activity.60 Alternatively, there exist cases of
private-public “entanglement” where a governmental actor “affirmatively
authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private conduct that violates the
Constitution.”61 In these cases, the analysis must consider whether the actions
of a private actor are “fairly attributable to the state.”62
First, this Part will dispose of two preliminary state action concerns: the
false dichotomy between state action and federal action, and the
transsubstantivity of the state action doctrine. Second, it will consider the state
action test set forth in Lebron. Third, it will survey five categories of
entanglement state action analyses.
56 Id. at 349 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
are “credited with mandating the requirement for state action.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 520.
57 There are two major exceptions by which courts classify otherwise private conduct as state action.
First, the public function exception finds state action “in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. Second, the entanglement exception requires
private conduct to comply with constitutional safeguards if it is “fairly attributable to the state.” Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
58 Katie Lamb Balthrop, Locating the Sphere of State Action in the Context of Mortgage Foreclosure by
Federally-Related Entities 5 (April 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
59 See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (imposing First Amendment
restrictions on Amtrak after determining it was a governmental actor); Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n,
362 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2004) (imposing due process restrictions on library after determining it was a
governmental actor).
60 See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353, 358–59 (state action not implicated because the operation of a
public utility is not a public function); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 476–77 (1953) (state action implicated
because the operation of primary elections is a public function); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507–08
(1946) (state action implicated where a private corporation owned and regulated an area containing both
commercial and residential districts because the regulation of a town is a public function). This Comment does
not consider the public function exception because “[m]ortgage foreclosures through power of sale agreements
are not powers of a governmental nature.” Northrip v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 527 F.2d 23, 31 (6th Cir.
1975).
61 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 539.
62 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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A. Preliminary State Action Concerns
For present purposes, there is no distinction between “state action” (i.e.,
states qua states) and “federal action” because courts use the same analysis to
determine whether an actor is susceptible to Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional claims.63 Although the FHFA conservatorship of Fannie and
Freddie involves federal action, jurisprudence considering state action is
equally applicable to determining whether the entities are state actors. For
present purposes, “state actor” also refers to federal actors.
The state action doctrine is transsubstantive; determining an entity to be a
state actor for the purposes of one kind of constitutional claim renders that
entity a state actor generally.64 For example, although the Court in Lebron
considered a First Amendment claim, the Lebron test is not unique to First
Amendment cases.65 Rather, the Lebron test is applicable to other
constitutional claims.66 Thus, Fannie and Freddie may be determined state
actors for the purposes of due process by tests originally arising under different
constitutional claims.
The state is, to some extent, involved with all private action resulting in the
deprivation of constitutional values.67 Distinguishing between gradations of

63 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114–21 (1973) (relying on cases
assessing both federal action and state action); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 996 (4th ed. 2007) (“The phrase ‘state action’ is a
misnomer because the issue arises in an identical manner when the federal government or its agents are
involved in a case.”); ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.2 (“Courts have viewed the assessment of state
action (for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment) and federal action (for the Fifth Amendment) to be the
same analysis.”).
64 See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 451, 475 (2007); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 847 (2001).
65 The Court explicitly conflated the state action requirement for the First Amendment and for
constitutional claims in general. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (holding
Amtrak to be “part of the Government for the purposes of the First Amendment” and “an agency or
instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by
the Constitution” (emphasis added)).
66 One caveat to transsubstantivity deserves mention. Although state action analyses are generally
exportable from one constitutional context to another, “a review of the decisions indicates that the Court has
been much more likely to apply the [state action] exceptions in cases involving race discrimination than in
cases involving other constitutional claims.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 530.
67 See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND?: A
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS WITH PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 76 (1988) (arguing that wherever a state affords legal
repercussions to transactions between persons there is state action); Kevin Cole, Federal and State “State
Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 349–50 (1990)
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government involvement has produced a complex and seemingly inconsistent
state action doctrine.68 This Comment does not attempt to demystify the
conceptual framework for determining a state actor.69 Rather, it parses Court
precedent to determine whether Fannie and Freddie might qualify as state
actors by virtue of the FHFA conservatorship.
Fannie and Freddie could be considered state actors through two distinct
analyses. First, Fannie and Freddie might be “part of the government” under
the Lebron test, in which case there is no need to resort to an exception
rendering private action attributable to the government. Alternatively, if Fannie
and Freddie are not “part of the government” under the Lebron test, the entities
could still be considered state actors if there exists sufficient government
involvement to attribute their actions to the state. Because state action analyses
are “necessarily fact-bound,”70 the facts and reasoning of Lebron and the
entanglement cases are addressed in turn.
B. The Lebron Test: When an Entity is “Part of the Government”
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Supreme Court
considered whether Amtrak was subject to constitutional constraints.71 The
petitioner entered into a contract with a third-party company to lease a
billboard in Amtrak’s Pennsylvania Station.72 “Amtrak’s vice-president
disapproved the advertisement, invoking Amtrak’s policy . . . ‘that it will not
allow political advertising on the . . . advertising sign.’”73 The petitioner filed
suit, claiming that Amtrak’s refusal to place his advertisement violated his
constitutional rights.74
The Court concluded that Amtrak was “part of the government” and held
that where “the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the

(arguing that because “state action” could be construed as all-encompassing, the term must be viewed as a
term of art).
68 See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (remarking that the state action doctrine is “a conceptual
disaster area”).
69 For such an attempt, see John Dorsett Niles et al., Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 885, 902–04 (2011).
70 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
71 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995).
72 Id. at 376. The billboard was of “colossal proportions . . . . approximately 103 feet long and 10 feet
high.” Id.
73 Id. at 377.
74 Id.
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furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent
authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the
corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment.”75
This analysis “is understood to [have] establish[ed] a two prong [state action]
test: government purpose and government control.”76
First, assessing Amtrak’s government purpose, the Court found that
Amtrak was created “explicitly for the furtherance of federal governmental
goals”77—namely to avert the threatened extinction of passenger trains.78 The
Court noted that Amtrak’s charter stated, “[P]ublic convenience and necessity
require the continuance and improvement of rail passenger service.”79 Second,
assessing the extent of government control of Amtrak, the Court found
persuasive that eight of Amtrak’s nine directors were appointed directly by the
President,80 and that the United States held all of the preferred stock in
Amtrak81 while subsidizing Amtrak’s perennial losses.82 The Court noted,
“Amtrak is not merely in the temporary control of the Government (as a
private corporation whose stock comes into federal ownership might be).”83 No
weight was placed on the fact that Amtrak’s charter disclaimed status as a
federal agency.84
Importantly, the Court explicitly found Amtrak to be a government entity
and, as such, subject to constitutional constraints. It did not base its reasoning
on an analysis of Amtrak being a private actor subject to constitutional scrutiny
because of its relationship with the government.85 Thus, the Lebron test is
properly understood to determine when an entity is “part of the government”;
Amtrak could have failed the Lebron test but still have qualified as a state actor
if the government was sufficiently involved with the action at issue.
75

Id. at 400.
Roisman, supra note 6, at 157.
77 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397.
78 Id. at 383.
79 Id. at 384 (quoting RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE ACT OF 1970 § 101, 84 Stat. 1328) (emphasis omitted).
80 Id. at 385.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 398.
84 Id. at 392; accord Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015)
(“Congressional pronouncements . . . are not dispositive as to Amtrak’s status as a government entity.”
(citations omitted)).
85 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 378 (“We have held once and said many times, that actions of private entities can
sometimes be regarded as governmental action for constitutional purposes. . . . It may be unnecessary to
traverse that difficult terrain in the present case, since Lebron’s first argument is that Amtrak is not a private
entity but Government itself.”).
76
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The Lebron decision left unanswered whether government control must be
literally permanent. The Court found the government-control prong satisfied
where the government “retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a
majority of the directors” of Amtrak.86 Read narrowly, government control of
an indefinite, but not explicitly permanent, duration might not satisfy the test.
However, read broadly, permanent control might be just one of many possible
indicia of government control.87 Indefinite authority to appoint 100% of a
corporation’s directors might suffice by itself. Perhaps Lebron was an easy
case and Amtrak was so clearly a “part of the government” that the Court’s
finding of permanent control to appoint a majority of directors is not a
minimum, but well within the realm of government control sufficient to render
an entity “part of the government.” Indeed, permanence in the context of
statutes and regulations—which are always subject to amendment or repeal—
has little inherent meaning.88 Lower courts are left to grapple with these
questions, the resolution of which is highly relevant to the case of Fannie and
Freddie, because the FHFA retains indefinite, but not “permanent,” control of
both entities.89
C. The Entanglement Doctrine: When Private Action Is Attributable to the
State
Although “most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only
against infringement by governments,”90 otherwise private conduct qualifies as
86

Id. at 400.
Roisman, supra note 6, at 185. The Supreme Court recently addressed Amtrak’s constitutional status
in Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads. 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). Notably, the Court
did not mention permanence of government control in its analysis:
87

Given the combination of these unique features and its significant ties to the Government,
Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise. Among other important considerations, its
priorities, operations, and decisions are extensively supervised and substantially funded by the
political branches. A majority of its Board is appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate and is understood by the Executive to be removable by the President at will. Amtrak was
created by the Government, is controlled by the Government, and operates for the Government’s
benefit.
Id. at 1232.
88

Roisman, supra note 6, at 185.
See FAQs: Questions and Answers on Conservatorship, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY (Sept. 7, 2008),
http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Fact-Sheet-Questions-and-Answers-on-Conservatorship.aspx
(“Upon the Director’s determination that the Conservator’s plan to restore the Company to a safe and solvent
condition has been completed successfully, the Director will issue an order terminating the conservatorship. At
present, there is no exact time frame that can be given as to when this conservatorship may end.”).
90 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
89
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state action if the deprivation is “fairly attributable to the State.”91 Under the
entanglement exception, constitutional requirements must be satisfied if the
government “affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private
conduct that violates the Constitution.”92 Cases considering when the action of
a private entity is fairly attributable to the state are not easily distilled into tests
like that of Lebron.93 Although the following cases do not lend themselves to
mechanical formulas,94 they provide a basis from which to argue for state
action by precedent and analogy. Entanglement analyses are presented in five
categories: (1) private-public symbiosis; (2) government encouragement; (3)
sufficient nexus; (4) joint participation; and (5) entwinement.95
1. Private-Public Symbiosis
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Supreme Court found state
action where the relationship between a private restaurant and a state agency
conferred mutual benefits.96 The appellant sued the Wilmington Parking
Authority (Parking Authority), a Delaware state agency, claiming violations of
the Equal Protection Clause.97 A private restaurant refused to serve the
appellant food or drink because he was an African-American.98 The restaurant
leased space from, and was located within, a parking complex owned and
operated by the Parking Authority.99 The Court considered whether the “degree
of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action” was sufficient
to impute the conduct of the restaurant to the state.100
The Court found that the relationship conferred mutual benefits on the
restaurant and the Parking Authority: the Parking Authority conducted upkeep
and maintenance on the facility with public funds;101 the restaurant benefited
91

Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 539.
93 Id. at 530 (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a meaningful line as to the point where the
involvement is great enough to require the private action to comply with the Constitution.”).
94 Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State
Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 221 (“[T]here are no generally accepted formulas for
determining when a sufficient amount of government action is present in a practice to justify subjecting it to
constitutional restraints.”).
95 Although these categories of analysis are not hermetically sealed, they provide a useful analytical
framework for application to Fannie and Freddie in Part IV.
96 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
97 Id. at 716.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 724.
101 Id. at 723.
92
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from the Parking Authority’s tax-exempt status;102 and the relationship
afforded customers a convenient place to park, which created additional
demand for the Parking Authority’s parking facilities.103 “[B]enefits mutually
conferred,” the Court held, “together with the obvious fact that the restaurant is
operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a public parking
service, indicates that degree of state participation and involvement in
discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to
condemn.”104 Although the Parking Authority took no affirmative action in
discriminating against the appellant, the “Authority, and through it the
State . . . has elected to place its power, property, and prestige” behind the
conduct.105
The Court in Burton offered no bright-line rule for when the government is
sufficiently involved with a private entity to constitute state action.106
Nonetheless, the case stands for the proposition that a “symbiotic relationship”
between the state and a private entity will render conduct of the entity
attributable to the state.107 Burton has not been overruled, but because the
Court is “much more likely to apply the [state action] exceptions in cases
involving race discrimination,”108 its applicability in cases involving other
constitutional claims is uncertain.
2. Government Encouragement
A decade after Burton, the Court considered whether the state grant of a
liquor license to Moose Lodge, a private club that restricted membership to
white males, could render the club’s discrimination state action for the
purposes of equal protection.109 In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, the appellee
sued the private club and the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority (Liquor
Authority) after being refused service.110 The appellee argued that the club’s

102

Id. at 719.
Id. at 724.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 725.
106 Id. at 722 (“[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the
Equal Protection Clause is an ‘impossible task’ which ‘[t]his Court has never attempted.’” (quoting Kotch v.
Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947))).
107 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 544.
108 Id. at 530.
109 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1972).
110 Id. at 164–65.
103
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refusal of service was state action because the Liquor Authority authorized and
regulated the sale of alcohol on the club’s premises.111
The Court found that the relationship between the Liquor Authority and
club did not approach the “symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee
that was present in Burton.”112 Although the Liquor Authority conferred a
benefit on the club and had authority to regulate it, the Court declined to find
state action in every instance where a “private entity receives any sort of
benefit or service at all from the State, or [where] it is subject to regulation in
any degree whatever.”113 Distinguishing Moose Lodge from the restaurant in
Burton, the Court found, “In short, while Eagle was a public restaurant in a
public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private building.”114
Next, the Court considered the extent of government regulation, holding that
the Liquor Authority’s regulation of Moose Lodge did not sufficiently
implicate the state.115 Although the Court acknowledged that state regulation of
the club was “detailed . . . in some particulars, it cannot be said to foster or
encourage racial discrimination.”116
It is unclear whether the distinction between state participation in Burton
and Moose Lodge is one of degree or kind. Both cases involved state
nonfeasance and arose in the context of equal protection, where the Court is
most likely to find state action.117 Neither the Liquor Authority in Moose
Lodge nor the Parking Authority in Burton actively enforced the
discriminatory policies of the private actor.118 But, while the Court found state
action in Burton because “the Authority could have affirmatively required
Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment
imposed upon the private enterprise as a consequence of state participation,”119
it failed to find state action in Moose Lodge although the Liquor Authority
could have conditioned its grant of liquor licenses to private clubs on nondiscriminatory membership policies.120
111

Id. at 165.
Id. at 175.
113 Id. at 173.
114 Id. at 175.
115 Id. at 177.
116 Id. at 176–77.
117 See supra note 66.
118 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (“By its inaction, the Authority, and
through it the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.” (emphasis added)).
119 Id.
120 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 545.
112
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The Court’s analysis in Moose Lodge is best understood in two parts. First,
the Court contrasted the nature of the lessor-lessee relationship in Burton with
that of the Liquor Authority and Moose Lodge.121 This analysis focused on
mutuality of benefits conferred by the relationship; the Court concluded that
the symbiosis present in Burton was lacking in Moose Lodge.122 Second, the
Court considered the extent of regulation exercised by the Liquor Authority
over Moose Lodge.123 This inquiry, seemingly distinct from the previous,
considered whether the extent of regulation can be said to “foster or
encourage” the constitutional deprivation.124 Thus, it is plausible that an
extensive regulatory scheme, even absent the symbiosis present in Burton,
could satisfy the state action requirement if the regulation fosters or encourages
the private action.125 Both analyses would be applied two years later in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
3. Sufficient Nexus
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Supreme Court formulated a
new test for state action: “[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity
so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”126
Citing Burton, the Court admonished that a detailed factual inquiry concerning
the nature of state involvement is required to determine whether the test is
met.127
The petitioner, Jackson, sued Metropolitan Edison, a privately owned and
operated utility company, claiming due process violations under the Fourteenth
Amendment.128 Jackson argued that the company’s termination of electrical
service to her home without notice after alleged nonpayment constituted a
deprivation of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.129 Jackson
contended that the company’s termination of her service was attributable to the
state because the company was subject to extensive regulation by the

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175.
Id.
Id. at 176–77.
Id.
See infra Part I.D.
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723 (1961)).
Id. at 346–48.
Id.
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Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission).130 The Court’s state
action analysis considered both the extent of government regulation and the
symbiosis between the utility company and the Commission.131
First, considering the extent of government regulation, the Court noted,
“extensive and detailed” state regulation of a business “does not by itself
convert its action into that of the State.”132 The Court acknowledged that the
utility company was “subject to a form of extensive regulation by the State in a
way that most other business enterprises are not.”133 But, citing Moose Lodge,
the Court emphasized that the state regulation, though “extensive . . . . cannot
be said to in any way foster or encourage” the deprivation.134 The Court noted
that the company had filed with the Commission a general provision stating its
right to terminate service for nonpayment.135 The only connection between the
Commission and the company’s termination provision was a “simple notice
filing with the Commission and the lack of any Commission action to prohibit
it.”136 The Court held that mere approval by the Commission of a regulated
company’s provision, “where the commission has not put its own weight on
the side of the proposed practice by ordering it,” does not render the
company’s practice state action.137
Second, the Court failed to find a symbiotic relationship between the
company and the Commission.138 Distinguishing Burton, the Court found the
Commission had not “so far insinuated itself in a position of
interdependence . . . that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.”139
Although the company paid state taxes and was subject to extensive regulation,

130 Id. at 358. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission empowered the utility company to deliver
electricity to the area encompassing Jackson’s residence and provided the right to discontinue service to any
customer on reasonable notice of nonpayment. Jackson argued alternatively that state action was present
because “respondent provides an essential public service . . . and hence performs a ‘public function.’” Id. at
352. The Court rejected this argument but set forth the current formulation of the public function exception:
there is state action “in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State.” Id.
131 See infra notes 132–41.
132 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350.
133 Id. at 358.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 354.
136 Id. at 355.
137 Id. at 357.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 357–58.
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such a relationship did not make the state “in any realistic sense a partner or
even a joint venturer” in the enterprise.140
In conclusion, the Court found that the extent of government regulation and
absence of a symbiotic relationship did not constitute a sufficient nexus to
render the company’s termination of Jackson’s service attributable to the
state.141 It appears that the “sufficient nexus” test encompasses both the
“private-public symbiosis” test of Burton and “foster or encourage” test of
Moose Lodge; it is thus better understood as a reformulation of previous tests
than a new one.142
4. Joint Participation
Eight years later, in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., the Court applied a
different two-part analysis to assess whether conduct causing the deprivation
of a constitutional right is fairly attributable to the State: (1) “the deprivation
must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State
or a rule of conduct imposed by it or by a person for whom it is responsible”;
and (2) “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may be
fairly said to be a state actor . . . . [either] because he [or she] is a state official,
because he [or she] has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from
state officials, or because his [or her] conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
state.”143 This analysis focused on both the nature of the action and the identity
of the actor.
The Court found the facts of Lugar satisfied this two-part test.144 The
petitioner, an operator of a truck stop in Virginia, was indebted to Edmondson
Oil Company (Company).145 Fearing that the petitioner would dispose of his
property to defeat his creditors, the Company sought prejudgment attachment
of the petitioner’s property in state court pursuant to state law.146 The court
clerk issued a writ of attachment, which was subsequently executed by a
county sheriff.147
140

Id. at 358 (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176–77 (1972)).
Id. at 358–59.
142 It is a tautology to state that private action may be fairly attributed to the state when the relationship
between the action and the state is sufficiently close.
143 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
144 Id. at 942.
145 Id. at 924.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 924.
141
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The first prong was satisfied because the Court found that the claimed
deprivation—prejudgment attachment of petitioner’s property—resulted from
the exercise of a state-created procedural scheme.148 Further, the Court found
that the participation of the sheriff, a “state official,” satisfied the second prong
of the analysis.149 In other words, state action exists where a private party
causes a constitutional deprivation pursuant to state-created law and with the
aid of a state official.
The Court’s analysis appears straightforward but is not easily reconciled
with Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,150 decided only four years prior. In that case, the
petitioner was evicted from her home, and the city marshal arranged for her
furniture to be stored in the respondent’s warehouse.151 After nonpayment, the
warehouse-creditor threatened to sell the petitioner’s furniture pursuant to a
state-created self-help provision.152 Ultimately, the Court held that the
creditor’s action could not be “fairly attributed” to the state because of the
“total absence of overt official involvement.”153
Although the participation of the state sheriff in Lugar distinguishes its
facts from Flagg Bros., this might be a distinction without a difference. In both
cases, the state created the statutory scheme facilitating the property
deprivation; the procedure in Lugar required the participation of a sheriff,154
while the procedure in Flagg Bros. did not.155 The involvement of a state
official in Lugar occurred precisely because the state law required it.156 If the
rationale in Lugar is that the joint participation of the sheriff in the property
deprivation endorses the act, such that it is attributable to the state, it is unclear
why this rationale ought not apply where the state, through legislation,
endorses a deprivation ex ante. Despite the shortcomings of the second prong,
the Lugar test has been applied in subsequent cases.157

148

Id. at 941.
Id.
150 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
151 Id. at 153.
152 Id. at 153, 156 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 7-210).
153 Id. at 157.
154 See supra note 149.
155 See supra note 153.
156 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 543.
157 See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 500 U.S. 42, 52 (1992); Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
149
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5. Entwinement
The latest Supreme Court case to recognize state action by virtue of
government involvement with a private actor is Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.158 In Brentwood, the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), a private organization
comprised of Tennessee schools that regulated high school athletics, suspended
Brentwood Academy’s (Academy) athletic program pursuant to a TSSAA rule
prohibiting “undue influence” in recruitment practices.159 The Court held that
the TSSAA was sufficiently “entwined” with the government to make it a state
actor for the purposes of the Academy’s constitutional claims.160
First, the Court restated the sufficient nexus test from Jackson,161 but
qualified that “[w]hat is fairly attributable to the state is a matter of normative
judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity.”162 No one set of circumstances
is “absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against
attributing activity to the government.”163 This language suggests a balancing
test, where facts tending to attribute private activity to the government are
weighed against “countervailing reasons.”164
The Court found that the “nominally private” status of TSSAA was
converted to state action by “pervasive entwinement of public institutions and
public officials” in its workings.165 The relationship between the TSSAA and
public institutions evinced both “bottom-up” and “top-down” entwinement.166
From the bottom-up, 84% of TSSAA members were public schools, and
158

531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
Id. at 291–93.
160 It remains unclear whether Brentwood carves a new “entwinement” state action exception or falls
within the entanglement exception. The Court did not use the term “entanglement” or apply the public function
exception. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 539. The Court used the term “entwinement” in Evans v. Newton.
382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (“Conduct that is formally ‘private’ may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations
placed upon state action.”). However, entwinement was not considered a distinct state action test; the issue was
whether a park is a “public facility” that “serves the community.” Id. at 301–02.
161 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295 (“[S]tate action may be found if . . . there is such a ‘close nexus between
the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.’” (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974))).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 295–96. The Court found such a “countervailing reason” in Polk County v. Dodson. 454 U.S.
312, 322 n.13 (1981) (holding that county-employed public defender was not a state actor because the public
defender did “not act on behalf of the State,” but as the “State’s adversary”).
164 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295.
165 Id. at 298.
166 See infra notes 167–70.
159
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representatives from those schools would select members of the TSSAA
legislative council and board;167 the majority of TSSAA funding came from
gate receipts at public school sporting events, such that “the Association . . .
enjoys the schools’ moneymaking capacity as its own.”168 The TSSAA would
be unrecognizable without the membership and financial support of public
school officials, who “overwhelmingly perform all but the purely ministerial
acts by which the Association exists.”169 From the top-down, State Board
members served as members of the TSSAA legislative council and board, and
TSSAA employees were eligible for membership in the state retirement
system.170 Such a showing of entwinement, the Court held, requires that the
private organization be “judged by constitutional standards.”171
Four dissenting Justices argued that the majority holding extended the state
action doctrine beyond existing precedent.172 Although public schools did
provide a portion of TSSAA funding, “nothing in the record suggest[ed] that
the State ha[d] encouraged” the TSSAA in enforcing the disputed rule.173 The
dissent’s concern lends credibility to an expansive entwinement exception:
pervasive government involvement with nominally private conduct can make
such conduct fairly attributable to the government, even if the government
does not foster or encourage the conduct.
D. Fair Attribution: The Principle Underlying Entanglement
The Court has declined to answer “whether these different [state action]
tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of
characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court.”174
Members of the Court have acknowledged, however, that the tests all have a
common purpose: to determine “whether an action ‘can fairly be attributed to
the State.’”175 Although the analysis is “necessarily fact-bound,” it is possible
to extrapolate underlying principles warranting fair attribution of private
conduct to the government.176
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 310.
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 306 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
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Before Brentwood, fair attribution required a finding of private-public
symbiosis,177 government regulation fostering or encouraging a constitutional
deprivation,178 a “sufficient nexus” between the government and private actor
causing the deprivation,179 or joint participation between a state and private
actor in the exercise of a state-created right.180 For the foregoing tests, fair
attribution requires more than government acquiescence in the deprivation.
First, symbiosis requires that extensive benefits be mutually conferred to
support a finding that the state “has elected to place its power . . . behind the
conduct.181 Second, government regulation, even when extensive, falls short of
state action where it “cannot be said . . . to foster or encourage” the
unconstitutional conduct.182 Third, joint participation supports a finding of
state action because it indicates the state is a “willful participant” in the
deprivation.183 For these tests, state action is only found where the government,
either actively or by virtue of a symbiotic relationship with the private actor,
affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates a constitutional violation.184
In contrast, Brentwood suggests that private conduct can be fairly attributed
to the state absent government authorization, encouragement, or facilitation of
the constitutional violation. The majority opinion focused not on whether the
government encouraged the particular TSSAA rule permitting the deprivation,
but rather on the relationship between the government and TSSAA. In other
words, the Court analyzed the connection between the state and the private
actor, not the connection between the state and the private action. This
analysis is peculiar considering that the Brentwood opinion began with a
restatement of the “sufficient nexus” test,185 which examines the nexus
“between the State and the challenged action”186—not the private actor.187
177

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176–77 (1972).
179 The sufficient nexus test as stated in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. is not a conceptually distinct
state action test. See supra note 142.
180 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
181 Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. Subsequent cases made clear that state action does not exist in every instance
where a “private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to
regulation in any degree whatever.” Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173.
182 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176–77.
183 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)).
184 CHEMERINSKY supra note 48, at 551.
185 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athl. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
186 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
187 This analysis departs from Moose Lodge, where the Court examined the connection between the
Liquor Authority and the racist member policy, and Jackson, where the Court analyzed the connection
between the Utility Commission and the termination provision. See supra text accompanying notes 112, 133.
178
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Thus, post-Brentwood, pervasive government involvement with a private actor
may fairly attribute an otherwise private deprivation to the government, even
where the government does not foster or encourage the alleged deprivation.
Pervasive government involvement, however, might fall short in the face of a
“countervailing reason.”188
III. CREATION, PURPOSE, AND REGULATION OF FANNIE, FREDDIE, AND GINNIE
This Part provides the necessary groundwork for application of the
foregoing state action tests to Fannie and Freddie. Ginnie Mae,189 another
federal entity involved in the mortgage market, provides a useful contrast to
Fannie and Freddie. This Part first considers the creation of Fannie, Freddie,
and Ginnie. Second, it describes Congress’ purpose in chartering the three
entities. Next, it evaluates the deprivatization of Fannie and Freddie under the
HERA. Finally, it assesses the extent of government regulation exercised over
Fannie and Freddie under the FHFA conservatorship.
A. History and Purpose of the Entities
The federal government has become increasingly involved in the mortgage
market over the past eighty years.190 Congress has chartered several agencies
and corporations to improve the functioning of the residential mortgage
market.191 Some of these entities exist as pure government agencies within the
Cabinet. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), provides
mortgage insurance and home loans to qualifying mortgagors;192 the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides partial mortgage guaranties and
loans to qualifying veterans.193 Others, such as Fannie and Freddie, are not

Both cases distinguished between the extent of state regulation of the private actors and the state’s relationship
with the alleged deprivation.
188 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296.
189 Ginnie Mae’s corporate name is the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA).
12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2)(A) (2012).
190 See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 6, § 12.1(b) (noting the federal government has been a market
regulator, a market participant by originating and holding mortgages, and an indirect market participant by
insuring and guaranteeing loans).
191 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 932.
192 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707–1709 (2012).
193 38 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012); 12 U.S.C. §§ 3711–3712 (2006); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3,
at 932.
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pure government agencies.194 Although established by congressional charter,
the independence of such entities complicates the state action analysis.
1. The Creation of Fannie and Ginnie
Fannie and Ginnie were originally created as a single entity, the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA), in 1938.195 The Administrator of the
FHA chartered the FNMA to provide liquidity to the mortgage market by
purchasing FHA-insured mortgages.196 The FNMA was originally “wholly
owned and administered by the federal government” but, in 1954, became a
“mixed ownership” corporation owned in part by private shareholders.197 The
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 divided the FNMA into two
separate entities198—Fannie and Ginnie—“each of which inherited a portion of
the original FNMA’s duties.”199
Ginnie emerged as a “pure federal agency” within the HUD.200 Ginnie
retained the FNMA’s pre-1954 mortgage portfolio and continued to purchase
mortgages insured by the FHA, VA, and Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA).201 In contrast, Fannie was reconstituted as a government-sponsored
entity—a privately owned and operated corporation with “certain ties to the
federal government.”202 Its function is to continue purchasing residential and
other mortgages from lenders, providing liquidity to the mortgage market.203
Unlike Ginnie, which is limited to the purchase of FHA-insured and VAguarantied mortgages,204 Fannie is authorized to purchase conventional
residential mortgages.205

194

See infra notes 197, 210.
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 932, 932 n.4 (“Fannie Mae’s original charter was
contained in Title III of the National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1938).”).
196 See Implementing Authority of HUD Over Conduct of Secondary Market Operations of FNMA, 43
Fed. Reg. 36201 (Aug. 15, 1978). FNMA’s charter was later expanded to allow the purchase of
VA-guaranteed mortgages. ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (2d ed. 2010).
197 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 932.
198 12 U.S.C. § 1716(b) (2012).
199 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 932.
200 Id. at 932–33; see 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2)(A) (2012).
201 12 U.S.C. § 1716(b) (2012); Regulations Implementing Authority of HUD Over Conduct of Secondary
Market Operations of FNMA, 43 Fed. Reg. 36200, 36202 (Aug. 15, 1978).
202 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 933.
203 Id.
204 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716, 1716(b) (2012).
205 SCHWARTZ, supra note 196, at 57.
195
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2. The Creation of Freddie
Two years after the separation of Fannie and Ginnie, Freddie was born.206
Freddie Mac—originally known as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC)—was created by the Emergency Home Finance Act207
to compete with the newly privatized Fannie and to expand the secondary
mortgage market for the savings and loan industry.208
Although “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began life quite differently, they
have become increasingly similar.”209 Freddie was originally a public
corporation, owned by the Federal Home Loan Bank System and governed by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), but Freddie was privatized
after the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).210 FIRREA abolished the FHLBB and
“gave Freddie Mac a new board structure virtually identical to Fannie
Mae’s.”211 Like Fannie, Freddie is authorized to purchase conventional
residential mortgages in addition to FHA-insured and VA-guarantied
mortgages.212
3. The Purpose of Ginnie, Fannie, and Freddie
a. Ginnie
Ginnie was established by Congress to liquidate the existing FNMA
portfolio of “special assistance” loans and to take over special assistance
functions previously handled by the FNMA, including the purchase of
government-insured loans.213 Many of these loans are deemed important to

206

NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 933 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012)).
Id.
208 Alexander, supra note 51, at 321 (citing Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970
§§ 301–310, Pub. L. No. 91–351, 84 Stat. 451, 454–55 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1459 (1988
& Supp. II 1990))) (Congress created FHLMC primarily to assist savings and loan associations through the
purchase of VA, FHA, and conventional loans).
209 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 934.
210 See id. at 932, 934.
211 See id. at 934. Until 2008, Fannie’s board of directors consisted of eighteen persons, five of whom
were appointed by the President of the United States and thirteen of whom were elected by shareholders.
Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (2006) (“[Fannie] shall have a board of directors, which shall consist of
eighteen persons . . . .”), with 12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (2012) (“[Fannie] shall have a board of directors, which
shall consist of 13 persons . . . .”).
212 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 933.
213 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 938 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2)(A) (2012)).
207
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national housing policy but are unattractive to private lenders.214 Although
Ginnie furthers important policy goals by purchasing special assistance loans,
Ginnie has not affected the mortgage market as significantly as Fannie and
Freddie because Ginnie is only permitted to purchase government-insured and
government-guaranteed loans.215
Ginnie has most significantly affected the mortgage market by
guaranteeing mortgage-backed, pass-through securities.216 In these
transactions, lending institutions sell securities to investors that are
collateralized by pools of residential mortgages individually insured by the
FHA or VA.217 Investors receive monthly payments “corresponding to the
payments due on the underlying mortgages.”218 Because Ginnie is an agency of
the federal government under the HUD, its guarantees represent the full faith
and credit of the U.S. government.219 The Ginnie guarantee thus allows
investors to collect on securities even if the underlying mortgages experience
default; with such a strong guarantee, securities are “highly liquid and salable
at relatively low interest yields.”220
b. Fannie and Freddie
Fannie and Freddie were created to enhance the availability of mortgage
credit across the nation.221 The entities do so by purchasing mortgages from
lenders who use the proceeds to issue more mortgage loans.222 These mortgage
purchase operations require “huge amounts of capital.”223 Fannie and Freddie
are authorized to raise capital to support their operations in three ways: issuing
stock (both common and preferred); issuing bonds and notes; and issuing
mortgage-backed securities (MBS).224 Most mortgages purchased by Fannie
214 For example, Ginnie inherited from the FNMA many “below-market-interest-rate mortgages” under an
FHA-subsidized apartment program. See id. These mortgages bore a mere 3% interest rate. See id. Ginnie also
holds and purchases loans in urban renewal projects and Indian reservations. See id.
215 See 12 U.S.C. § 1716, 1716(b) (2012).
216 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 938; NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 485.
217 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 485.
218 Id.
219 See 12 U.S.C. § 1721 (2012); NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 485.
220 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 485.
221 See Government-Sponsored Enterprises: A Framework for Strengthening GSE Governance and
Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004)
[hereinafter Government-Sponsored Enterprises] (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the
United States), reprinted in NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 923.
222 See id. at 924.
223 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 934.
224 See id. § 11.3, at 934–35.

EYE GALLEYSPROOFS2

134

9/21/2015 11:53 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:107

and Freddie are placed in mortgage pools to support the sale of MBS, although
some are maintained in the entities’ portfolios.225
There are three notable differences between Ginnie, Fannie, and Freddie.
First, Ginnie is not authorized to purchase conventional mortgages, while
Fannie and Freddie have been authorized to do so since 1970.226 Second,
Ginnie is only authorized to issue guarantees of MBS,227 while Fannie and
Freddie may sell MBS directly to investors.228 Third, the federal government
explicitly backs Ginnie guarantees, while Fannie- and Freddie-issued MBS are
not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.229
Although Fannie and Freddie are not federally owned and operated under
the HUD like Ginnie,230 prior to the passage of the HERA, the entities were
subject to broad regulation by the Secretary of the HUD.231 Extensive federal
regulation led markets to perceive an implied federal guarantee on Fannie’s
and Freddie’s obligations.232 This implied guarantee allowed Fannie and
Freddie to borrow at interest rates below those of private corporate competitors
and to extend credit to financial institutions at favorable rates.233 Thus,
although Fannie and Freddie were privately owned,234 they have enjoyed the
same cost advantage as Ginnie. This implied guarantee would significantly
contribute to the financial downturn of both entities, ultimately leading to their
deprivatization in 2008.235

225

See Government-Sponsored Enterprises, supra note 221, at 924.
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 933.
227 Investor FAQ, FREDDIE MAC, www.freddiemac/investors/faq.html#differ (last visited July 20, 2015).
228 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 11.3, at 934.
229 See 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (2012) (abrogating liability for Fannie’s and Freddie’s debt); NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 938–39.
230 See supra notes 225–228.
231 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511, 4513 (2006), amended by Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No.
110-289, § 1101, 122 Stat. 2661 (2008). The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
regulated both Fannie and Freddie. See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(k) (2006) (Fannie); 12 U.S.C. § 1452(b)(2) (2006)
(Freddie). The OHFEO’s regulatory authority included “control of annual dividends, increases in total debt,
and the issuance of particular debt or equity securities.” See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 934
n.11.
232 See Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are “Too Big to Fail”: Balancing
Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 992–93 (1993).
233 See Government-Sponsored Enterprises, supra note 221, at 925.
234 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 196, at 57.
235 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 489.
226
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B. The Deprivatization of Fannie and Freddie
In response to the mortgage crisis of 2008, Congress expanded federal
regulation of Fannie and Freddie with the passage of the HERA.236 Well before
the HERA, it was clear that Fannie and Freddie posed systemic risks to the
stability of domestic and international financial systems.237 These risks
materialized as interest rates—which “beginning in 2001, were lower than at
any time in the Twentieth Century”—began to climb.238 Recently popularized
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)239 began to reset at new, higher market
interest rates, substantially increasing mortgagors’ monthly payments.240
Borrowers increasingly defaulted and the condition of the housing market
worsened, eroding investor confidence in Fannie and Freddie.241 In 2008 alone,
Fannie and Freddie lost more than $108 billion.242
1. The Passage of HERA
Congress sought to ameliorate the housing crisis with the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act, which, among other things, established the Federal
Housing and Finance Agency (FHFA).243 The FHFA, an “independent agency
of the federal government,”244 assumed the supervisory and regulatory
functions previously performed by the Secretary of the HUD and the
OFHEO—and then some.245 The FHFA was granted “broad authority to
regulate”246 Fannie and Freddie to ensure the entities operated in a “safe and

236 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4509 (2012); see 154
CONG. REC. H7857-04 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 2008) (statement of Rep. Stearns), 2008 WL 4146807 (Westlaw).
237 Due to their extensive sale of MBS, if Fannie and Freddie were to become insolvent, financial market
participants depending on payments from MBS would in turn be unable to meet their financial obligations. See
Government-Sponsored Enterprises, supra note 221, at 925–26.
238 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 486–88.
239 An adjustable-rate mortgage enables lenders to “periodically modify the interest rate over the life of
the loan as market rates change,” shifting risk of rate fluctuations to borrowers. Id. at 965.
240 NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 488. A full treatment of the housing crisis, even if possible, is outside
the scope of this Comment. For a more in-depth discussion of its underlying causes, see Nelson, supra note 6,
at 584–85.
241 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 585, 585 n.9.
242 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: A REVIEW OF TREASURY’S
FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS 73 (Dec. 14, 2010).
243 See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4509 (2012)); 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (2012).
244 See 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a) (2012).
245 See supra note 5.
246 Theresa R. DiVenti, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Past, Present, and Future, 11 CITYSCAPE 231, 232
(2009), http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/vol11num3/ch11.pdf.
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sound manner.”247 The Director of the fledgling FHFA was empowered to
“appoint the [FHFA] as conservator” for Fannie and Freddie.248
2. The FHFA Conservatorship
The condition of Fannie and Freddie continued to decline in the weeks
following the passage of HERA.249 By September 2008, stock prices for
Fannie and Freddie had fallen by 90% and were at an all-time low.250 At the
close of markets on September 5, 2008, “Fannie Mae was trading at $5.50 and
Freddie Mac at $4, down from $70 and $65” the previous year.251 Two days
later, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the FHFA placed Fannie
and Freddie into federal conservatorship.252 Before conservatorship, the HERA
increased the degree to which the federal government regulated the entities.253
Placement into conservatorship, however, marked a difference in kind: the
FHFA not only regulates the entities—it operates them.
As conservator, the FHFA assumed the power of Fannie’s and Freddie’s
boards of directors and management.254 The FHFA immediately replaced the
CEOs, nonexecutive chairmen, and boards of directors of Fannie and Freddie,
all of whom now report to the FHFA.255 In order to avert the systemic risk
posed by Fannie’s and Freddie’s debt and MBS portfolios, the Treasury and
the entities executed the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (the
SPSPA).256
247

See 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(1) (2012).
249 See 154 CONG. REC. H7857-04 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 2008) (statement of Rep. Stearns), 2008 WL
4146807 (Westlaw).
250 See id.
251 See Katie Lamb Balthrop, Locating the Sphere of State Action in the Context of Mortgage Foreclosure
by Federally-Related Entities 44 (April 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (citing
Stephen Labaton & Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Rescue Seen at Hand for 2 Mortgage Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/06/business/06fannie.html).
252 Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Treasury Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement on
Treasury & Fed. Housing Fin. Agency Action to Protect Fin. Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx.
253 See supra note 245–48.
254 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 616.
255 Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on
Conservatorship,
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/fhfa_consrv_faq_090708hp11
28.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2015).
256 See U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-PreferredStock-Agree/2008-8-7_SPSPA_FactSheet_508.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Public Affairs].
248
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Interestingly, the Treasury ascribed partial responsibility to the U.S.
government for the entities’ financial predicament.257 The Treasury attributed
investor overconfidence—a product of the perceived federal guarantee on
MBS issued by Fannie and Freddie—to “ambiguities in their [c]ongressional
charters,” and stated, “These ambiguities fostered enormous growth in GSE
[government-sponsored enterprise] debt outstanding.”258 The Treasury
believed the SPSPA to be the “most effective means of averting systemic
risk . . . . [and] more efficient than a one-time equity injection.”259
The terms of the Agreement were as follows: the Treasury committed $100
billion to each entity to back obligations owed to Fannie’s and Freddie’s
creditors and MBS holders;260 in return, Fannie and Freddie each agreed to
issue to the Treasury $100 billion of preferred senior stock with a 10%
coupon,261 in addition to warrants for the purchase of common stock of each
entity at a nominal price (a few cents per share).262 If exercised, the federal
government would receive a 79.9% ownership stake in each corporation.263
Since their placement into conservatorship, Fannie and Freddie have received
$187.5 billion in taxpayer support.264
There is no predicted termination date of the FHFA conservatorship.265
Although the FHFA Director is authorized to terminate the conservatorship
upon a determination that Fannie or Freddie has “returned to a safe and solvent
condition,”266 the FHFA has indicated that the conservatorship would remain
in place for the foreseeable future.267 Scholars agree that the FHFA
conservatorship is not likely to end any time soon.268
257

See id.
See id.
259 See id.
260 See id. The Stock Agreement was subsequently amended to raise the maximum aggregate amount of
funding to the greater of $200 billion, or $200 billion plus the cumulative amount funded through December
2012 less any surplus. Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement, at 1–2 (Dec. 24, 2009), http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-StockAgree/2009-12-24_SPSPA_FannieMae_Amendment2_508.pdf.
261 See U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Public Affairs, supra note 256; Nelson, supra note 6, at 616.
262 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 616.
263 See U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Public Affairs, supra note 256.
264 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2013, at 1 (2014).
265 See FAQs: Questions and Answers on Conservatorship, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Sept. 7, 2008)
http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Fact-Sheet-Questions-and-Answers-on-Conservatorship.aspx
(“At present, there is no exact time frame that can be given as to when this conservatorship may end.”).
266 See 12 C.F.R. § 1252 (2009), 2009 WL 210842.
267 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, A Strategic Plan For Enterprise Conservatorships: The Next Chapter in a
Story that Needs an Ending, in 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS 111 (2012) (explaining that the FHFA expects to
258
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IV. APPLICATION OF STATE ACTION ANALYSES TO FANNIE AND FREDDIE
This Part applies the state action analyses discussed in Part II to Fannie and
Freddie. The inquiry is whether Fannie and Freddie must satisfy due process
requirements when they initiate nonjudicial foreclosure. Section A applies the
Lebron test to Fannie and Freddie to determine whether the entities are “part of
the government.” Section B applies the entanglement analyses to determine
whether nonjudicial foreclosures initiated by Fannie and Freddie are
attributable to the state. Because Fannie and Freddie have become increasingly
similar in structure and purpose and are regulated by the FHFA under nearly
identical terms,269 application of the foregoing analyses applies equally to both.
A. Applying the Lebron Test
Lebron articulated a two-prong test to determine if an entity is “part of the
government”: government purpose and government control.270 Application of
the test must consider whether the government created Fannie and Freddie “for
the furtherance of governmental objectives” and whether the government
exercises sufficient control over the entities.271
1. Government Purpose
Fannie and Freddie satisfied the first prong of the Lebron test well before
the passage of HERA. Congress chartered the FNMA in 1938 and
subsequently reconstituted Fannie as a government-sponsored entity in
1968.272 Congress chartered the FHLMC in 1970 and reconstituted Freddie as
a government-sponsored entity, much like Fannie, in 1989.273 Both entities
were created for the furtherance of governmental objectives, namely to
strengthen the secondary mortgage market.274 Indeed, scholars and courts

continue its role as conservator “over the next few years”); Roisman, supra note 6, at 187, 187 n.318 (citing
FHFA OIG 2013 Semiannual Report (stating there is “no near-term resolution in sight”)).
268 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 616 (“[T]he federal government controls each entity for the foreseeable
future.”); Roisman, supra note 6, at 186–87 (explaining that federal control over Fannie and Freddie is
“permanent” in the sense that it will “continue into the indefinite future”).
269 See supra notes 256–59.
270 See supra note 76.
271 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995).
272 12 U.S.C. § 1716, 1716(b); see supra note 202.
273 See supra note 210.
274 NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 691.
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agreed that, even pre-conservatorship, Fannie and Freddie satisfied the first
prong.275
2. Government Control
Whether Fannie and Freddie satisfy the second prong is less clear.
Pre-conservatorship, courts acknowledged that the government exercised
control over the entities but concluded that such control fell short of the Lebron
requirement. For example, in American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Freddie failed the government control prong because the “governance structure
of Freddie Mac affords the government far less control over that corporation’s
operations than it had over Amtrak’s operations in Lebron.”276 Even preLebron, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that government
regulation of Fannie was not sufficient to implicate state action.277
Pre-conservatorship, the regulatory power exercised by the Secretary of
HUD and OHFEO over the entities fell short of government control over
Amtrak in Lebron: both Fannie and Freddie were privately owned; their
common stock was publicly traded; and the government appointed fewer than
one-third of the entities’ directors.278 In contrast, eight of Amtrak’s nine
directors were appointed directly by the President, and the government held all
of Amtrak’s preferred stock and subsidized its perennial losses.279 This
analysis, however, “may very well have been rendered obsolete”280 by
imposition of the FHFA conservatorship.
Post-conservatorship, regulatory and financial control exercised by the
FHFA over Fannie and Freddie exceeds that evinced in Lebron. In Lebron, the
Court found indicative of government regulatory control that the President
appoints a majority of Amtrak’s board.281 As conservator, one of FHFA’s first
275 See Am. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Ass’n, 75 F.3d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1996);
Northrip v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 527 F.2d 23, 30 (6th Cir. 1975); Daniel E. Blegen, The Constitutionality
of Power of Sale Foreclosures by Federal Government Entities, 62 MO. L. REV. 425, 445 (1997) (“Both
[Fannie and Freddie] satisfy the first prong of [Lebron], because they were both formed by the government to
further governmental objectives.”); Roisman, supra note 6, at 179, 179 n.273 (“Fannie and Freddie preconservatorship were held to have satisfied the government purpose prong of Lebron.”).
276 75 F.3d at 1408.
277 Northrip, 527 F.2d at 32 (analogizing Fannie to the public utility in Jackson).
278 Blegen, supra note 275, at 441.
279 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 385 (1995).
280 NELSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 691.
281 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397–99.
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actions was to “fundamentally change[] . . . [the entities’] management and
governance practices by appointing new CEOs, nonexecutive chairmen, and
boards of directors to both Enterprises.”282 What’s more, the FHFA wields the
whole power of Fannie’s and Freddie’s board.283 Thus, regardless of how the
board is appointed in the future, the FHFA calls the shots: the FHFA has issued
to the boards of both entities specific directives to reduce their risk profiles;284
prioritize foreclosure prevention operations;285 alter single-family guarantee
charges;286 consolidate sale programs;287 and reduce multifamily business
volume.288 The FHFA’s authority to micromanage the activities of the entities
demonstrates more government control than with Amtrak, where the President
could appoint a majority of directors but lacked authority to subsequently
direct the corporation’s affairs.
Further, the FHFA has assumed extensive financial control over Fannie and
Freddie. The Lebron Court found persuasive that the government held all
Amtrak’s preferred stock in exchange for subsidizing Amtrak’s perennial
losses.289 Similarly, the SPSPA executed between the Treasury and entities
effectively subsidizes the entities’ perennial losses; to date, the entities have
received over $187.5 billion in taxpayer support.290 In exchange for such
massive monetary infusions, Fannie and Freddie issued to the Treasury $200
billion in senior preferred stock with a 10% coupon and, more importantly,
warrants for the purchase of common stock of each entity for a few cents per
share.291 If exercised, “the federal government [would] receive a 79.9%
ownership stake in each corporation.”292 Thus, the SPSPA demonstrates the
same kind of financial control found dispositive in Lebron. Until a surprising
development of case law, scholars agreed that the FHFA conservatorship
satisfied both prongs of the Lebron test.293

282 Roisman, supra note 6, at 135 (citing Conservatorship and Receivership, 76 Fed. Reg. 35724-01 (June
6, 2011) (codified as amended 12 C.F.R. pts. 1229, 1237)).
283 Nelson, supra note 6, at 616.
284 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2013, at 8 (2014).
285 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2012, at 70 (2013).
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 14. For a fuller discussion of FHFA control over the entities, see Roisman, supra note 6, 179–80.
289 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 385 (1995).
290 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2013, at 1 (2014).
291 Nelson, supra note 6, at 616.
292 Id.; see U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Public Affairs, supra note 256.
293 Nelson, supra note 6, at 616; ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.2(b).
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3. An Unexpected Outcome: Herron v. Fannie Mae
The District Court for the District of Columbia departed from the expected
outcome in Herron v. Fannie Mae.294 In Herron, a former employee of Fannie
alleged that termination of her employment violated the First Amendment.295
Herron argued that imposition of the FHFA conservatorship transformed
Fannie into a state actor because the government exercises absolute regulatory
and financial control over Fannie for an indefinite amount of time.296 The court
applied the Lebron test to determine whether Fannie was a federal actor and
held that the second prong was not satisfied because the FHFA conservatorship
was not permanent.297
The court examined, in some detail, the extent of regulatory and financial
control exercised by the FHFA over Fannie.298 Despite finding extensive
government control, the Herron court held that Fannie was not a federal actor
because, “under the Lebron framework, permanent government control is
required.”299 In so doing, the Herron court distinguished itself as the first to
read “permanent control” as dispositive, rather than merely probative, of
government control sufficient to render a corporation “part of the
government.”300 Although the court conceded the FHFA retained indefinite
control over Fannie, such control fell short of the permanence requirement.301
294
295
296
297
298

857 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id. at 88.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 90.
[A]s conservator, FHFA is empowered to ‘(i) take over assets of and operation of [Fannie] with
all the powers of the shareholders, the directors, and the officers of the regulated entity and
conduct all business of the regulated entity; (ii) collect all obligations and money due [Fannie];
(iii) perform all functions of [Fannie] in the name of [Fannie] which are consistent with the
appointment as conservator or receiver; (iv) preserve and conserve the assets and property of
[Fannie]; and (v) provide by contract for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity, action or
duty of the Agency as conservator.’ Stip. ¶ 52 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(B)). FHFA as
conservator reconstituted Fannie Mae’s Board of Directors, who now serve on behalf of FHFA.

Id.

299

Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
Memorandum from Christopher Pottratz to Florence Roisman on “Permanence cases” (Oct. 1, 2012)
(on file with author) (explaining that, of the 225 cases that cited to Lebron at the time Herron was decided,
Herron was the only case to discuss a requirement of permanence). Permanence of control was not considered
at all in American Bankers Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). In that case, the Ninth Circuit
distilled from Lebron “two relevant criteria for judging Freddie Mac’s status as a federal entity”: “the extent to
which its objectives are governmental and the extent to which the government directs and controls the
corporation’s pursuit of those objectives.” Id. at 1406. The Ninth Circuit concluded that pre-conservatorship
300
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It is far from clear that Lebron requires government control to be literally
permanent.302 The Lebron Court found the government control prong satisfied
where the government “retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a
majority of the directors” of Amtrak.303 The Herron court effectively inserts
the word “only” into the holding of Lebron, making each factor indispensible.
But the Lebron Court did not explicitly mandate that state action could only be
found where the government retains permanent control to appoint more than
50% of a corporation’s directors; indefinite authority to appoint 100% of a
corporation’s directors might have sufficed. The Herron court did not
acknowledge the plausibility of such a reading.
The Herron court’s treatment of Lebron has attracted scholarly criticism.304
Professor Roisman argues, “The word [permanence] should not be used as a
shibboleth to immunize FHFA from responsibility for compliance with the
Constitution.”305 This argument is in keeping with the theme of Lebron, where
the Court admonished “[i]t surely cannot be that government, state or federal,
is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by
simply resorting to the corporate form.”306 Although Herron defied scholarly
predictions and applied a questionable formulation of the Lebron test, some
lower courts and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have followed Herron
without scrutinizing the merits of the permanence requirement.307
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision is the most intriguing. In Mik
v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., the court used only one paragraph to
determine that Freddie is not a government actor.308 The court cited two

Freddie was not a government actor because “the government does not control the operation of Freddie Mac
through its appointees.” Id. at 1406–09. Considering that the FHFA replaced Freddie’s board of directors and
currently micromanages its affairs, Freddie would likely be a state actor under the court’s reasoning.
301 Herron, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
302 See supra Part II.B.
303 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
304 See Roisman, supra note 6, at 179 (“[If] the Lebron standard were applicable here, it was satisfied.
Herron and the courts following it were wrong in holding otherwise.”); Eugene Volokh, Fannie Mae Is Not a
Government Actor for Constitutional Purposes, Despite Federal Takeover, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 1,
2012, 3:02 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/05/01/fannie-mae-is-not-a-government-actor-for-constitutionalpurposes-despite-federal-takeover/ (“I’m not sure [Herron] is right. The government is in some measure bound
by the First Amendment . . . even when it’s running entities that could be run privately . . . nor do I see a
difference between temporary control by the government and permanent control.”).
305 Roisman, supra note 6, at 185.
306 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397.
307 See supra note 15.
308 743 F.3d 149, 168 (6th Cir. 2014).
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cases.309 The first, American Bankers Mortgage Corp.,310 was decided preconservatorship and did not consider permanence a requirement of government
control.311 The second, Syriani v. Freddie Mac Multiclass Certificates, relied
entirely upon the permanence requirement espoused in Herron.312 The Mik
court’s reasoning, however thin, enjoys stare decisis in lower courts within the
Sixth Circuit.313
Until another court provides an independent analysis314 of Herron’s
reasoning and recognizes how it distorts Lebron, Fannie and Freddie are not
likely to be found governmental actors by that test. Even if such an
independent analysis does not occur, however, failure of the Lebron test does
not foreclose finding Fannie and Freddie to be state actors—at least two
alternatives remain. First, the FHFA is almost certainly a governmental actor;
it is an independent federal agency purely within the Executive branch.315 A
court might decide that Fannie and Freddie are indistinguishable from the
FHFA, in which case the entities might be state actors in a derivative sense.316
Alternatively, and as considered below, the entities might be state actors under
an entanglement test.
B. Applying the Entanglement Analyses
Even if Fannie and Freddie are determined to be private actors under
Lebron, their conduct may be fairly attributable to the state and thus subject to
constitutional constraints.317 Failure or satisfaction of a particular state action
309

Id.
Am. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1406–09 (9th Cir. 1996).
311 See supra note 300.
312 2012 WL 6200251, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2012).
313 The Sixth Circuit recently undermined Mik’s precedential value. Although the Mik court clearly
concluded that Freddie is not a government actor, the Sixth Circuit has since wavered on that premise. See
Rush v. Mac, No. 14-1476, 2015 WL 4069807, at *5 (6th Cir. July 6, 2015) (“[E]ven if Freddie Mac is a
government actor by reason of the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, its compliance
with Michigan’s foreclosure-by-advertisement procedures satisfied the requirements of the Due Process
Clause.”); see also Garcia v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 782 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2015).
314 The Supreme Court encourages such an independent analysis in Department of Transportation v. Ass’n
of American Railroads. 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015); see supra note 87.
315 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (2006).
316 See Roisman, supra note 6, at 175 (“FHFA is a federal agency; the foreclosures are effected by FHFA;
therefore, the Fifth Amendment applies.”). The Sixth Circuit recently lent credibility to Roisman’s argument,
noting, “We have not addressed the questions of whether the Federal Housing Finance Agency is a state actor
and what restrictions the Due Process Clause may impose on the Agency in its direction of Fannie Mae. We
find it unnecessary to wade into that discussion in this case.” Garcia, 782 F.3d at 740.
317 The “sufficient nexus” test from Jackson is not independently applied in this section because the test is
merely a reformulation of “fair attribution.” See supra discussion following note 141.
310

EYE GALLEYSPROOFS2

144

9/21/2015 11:53 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:107

test is not dispositive because the entanglement inquiry is “necessarily factbound.”318 Nonetheless, application of the tests reveals factors that can be
considered in determining whether Fannie and Freddie must satisfy due
process requirements when they initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.
1. Private-Public Symbiosis
First, the Court in Burton provides that when the government and a private
actor confer on each other extensive mutual benefits, symbiosis may indicate a
“degree of state participation and involvement” sufficient to find state
action.319
Even pre-conservatorship, the federal government, Fannie, and Freddie
conferred some degree of benefits on one another. Pursuant to their charters,
the entities furthered the governmental purpose of providing liquidity to the
mortgage market by purchasing both government-insured and private
mortgages.320 In return, Fannie- and Freddie-issued MBSs enjoyed a perceived
implicit guarantee on their obligations, allowing the entities to borrow at
interest rates below that of private corporate competitors and to extend credit
to financial institutions at favorable rates.321 Congress did not formally
abrogate liability until 2006.322 In fact, the Treasury explicitly acknowledged
that the government inflated investor confidence in the entities: “ambiguities in
[Fannie’s and Freddie’s] [c]ongressional charters . . . . fostered the enormous
growth in GSE debt outstanding.”323
Post-conservatorship, symbiosis is more evident. At the time HERA was
passed, the relationship between the entities and the government was more
accurately described as parasitic; the government prepared itself to assume a
massive financial and regulatory burden to avert economic catastrophe in the
housing market. But once the FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie into
conservatorship, the nature of the relationship changed. The SPSPA marked a
tremendous monetary infusion—to date, $187.5 billion—of taxpayer dollars to
back obligations owed to the entities’ creditors and MBS holders.324 In return,
Fannie and Freddie issued the Treasury $200 billion of preferred senior stock
318
319
320
321
322
323
324

See supra note 174.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
See supra note 212.
Government-Sponsored Enterprises, supra note 221, at 925.
12 U.S.C. § 4503 (2012).
U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Public Affairs, supra note 256.
FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2013, at 1 (2014).
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with a 10% coupon,325 in addition to warrants for the purchase of common
stock at a few cents per share which, if exercised, would give the federal
government a 79.9% ownership stake in each corporation.326 The Treasury
recoups cumulative cash dividends from the entities that, under the terms of the
SPSPA, do not offset or pay down prior draws from the Treasury.327 In short,
without intervention by the federal government, Fannie and Freddie would
likely have collapsed; without cash dividends and stock sales from the entities,
the federal government would not likely recover its investment.
Put simply, the federal government created the entities by statute and
resurrected the entities by subsequent statutory conservatorship. But for the
financial and regulatory assistance of the federal government, Fannie- and
Freddie-initiated foreclosures could not occur. Although the applicability of
Burton to cases outside the context of race discrimination is uncertain,328 the
Court is “most likely to find state action based on entanglement if it can be
shown that . . . the government is facilitating private conduct that otherwise
would not occur.”329 On balance, the symbiosis analysis suggests a degree of
state participation and involvement that requires Fannie and Freddie to satisfy
due process requirements when they initiate nonjudicial foreclosures.
2. Government Encouragement
Second, the Court held in Moose Lodge and Jackson that extensive
government regulation of a private entity does not impute state action unless it
can be said to “foster or encourage” the constitutional deprivation.330 State
action was not established in either case because the state did not play an
active role in the alleged unconstitutional deprivation. In Moose Lodge, the
Court found the Liquor Authority played “absolutely no part in establishing or
enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club” that excluded the
appellant on racial grounds;331 in Jackson, the Utility Commission approved

325

Nelson, supra note 6, at 616.
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred
Stock Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
pspa_factsheet_090708%20hp1128.pdf.
327 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2013, at iii (2014).
328 See supra note 66.
329 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 551.
330 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
176–77 (1972).
331 Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175.
326
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the utility’s termination provision but “[did] not put its own weight on the side
of the proposed practice by ordering it.”332
In Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, pre-conservatorship and
pre-Lebron, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Fannie was analogous
to the public utility in Jackson and thus not a state actor.333 The Sixth Circuit
assessed the degree of government regulation over Fannie, analyzing the
composition and appointment of members of the board of directors, the
supervisory and regulatory power exercised by the HUD, the public
availability of Fannie’s shares, and Fannie’s ability to borrow from the U.S.
Treasury.334 Despite extensive regulation by the federal government, the court
concluded that state action was not implicated.335 Further, the court noted that
the privatization of Fannie336 evinced congressional intent to dissociate itself
from Fannie’s operations “because it was not appropriate for the government to
be involved in the operation of a secondary mortgage market.”337
Every indicium of government control that the Sixth Circuit found lacking
in Northrip has been dramatically altered under the conservatorship. At the
time Northrip was decided, the government appointed one-third of Fannie’s
board;338 since then, the FHFA appointed new CEOs, nonexecutive chairmen,
and boards of directors to Fannie, all of whom now report directly to the
FHFA.339 The Secretary of HUD had authority to require that a portion of
Fannie’s mortgage purchases promote housing “for low and moderate income
families, but with reasonable economic return to the corporation”;340 the FHFA
currently has “broad authority” to regulate and control almost every aspect of
Fannie’s operations.341 The Secretary of Treasury “also ha[d] some control
over FNMA in relation to the issuance of debt securities and borrowing”;342
under the SPSPA, the Treasury committed $200 billion to back the obligations
of the entities.343 Likewise, congressional intent to dissociate the government
from the secondary mortgage market was undone by virtue of the FHFA
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
527 F.2d 23, 31–32 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 30–32.
Id. at 33.
See supra note 203.
Northrip, 527 F.2d at 32.
Id.
See supra note 282.
Northrip, 527 F.2d at 30.
DiVenti, supra note 246, at 232; see 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B) (2012); supra notes 282–91.
Northrip, 527 F.2d at 30–31.
See U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Public Affairs, supra note 256; supra note 291.
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conservatorship, which effectively deprivatized Fannie and Freddie.344 In short,
Northrip would come out differently today.
The Northrip analysis speaks to the relationship between the government
and Fannie without respect to the particular act of nonjudicial foreclosure.345
Under the Moose Lodge and Jackson standard, even pervasive government
regulation of a private actor falls short of state action where the regulation
cannot be said to foster or encourage the particular deprivation.346 However,
the FHFA does more than merely regulate Fannie and Freddie.347 Unlike the
Liquor Authority in Moose Lodge or the Utility Commission in Jackson, the
FHFA plays an active role in effecting a constitutional deprivation.348 Thus, the
government fosters and encourages nonjudicial foreclosures initiated by Fannie
and Freddie because the FHFA has the power to decide what form of
foreclosure the entities shall follow.
3. Joint Participation
Third, Lugar provided a two-part test for determining state action: first,
“the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State”; second, “the party charged with the deprivation must be
a person who may be fairly said to be a state actor. . . . [either] because he is a
state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid
from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State.”349
The first prong is satisfied when Fannie and Freddie initiate nonjudicial
foreclosures because power of sale foreclosure is a right created by the state.350
But, consistent with Lugar, courts and scholars maintain that legislative
authorization of nonjudicial foreclosure, without more, does not constitute
sufficient state action to trigger due process requirements.351 It is uncertain
344

See supra note 340.
See supra note 334. The Northrip analysis is more akin to that of Brentwood, where “pervasive
entwinement of public institutions and public officials” can compel attribution of private conduct to the state,
even if government involvement does not foster or encourage the conduct. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
346 See supra note 331.
347 See supra note 255.
348 Roisman, supra note 6, at 176–82.
349 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
350 See supra note 50.
351 See Alexander, supra note 51, at 367; see also ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.2 (“Thus far,
each court which has reviewed Georgia power of sale foreclosures initiated by nongovernmental entities has
345
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why a constitutionally deficient process endorsed by a state legislature is not
fairly attributable to the state absent further involvement by a state official.
Indeed, the risk of erroneous deprivations seems greater where a statute
permits a private individual to resort to self-help rather than requiring the
assistance of a state official. Nonetheless, nonjudicial foreclosures initiated by
Fannie and Freddie would not satisfy the Lugar test unless (1) the entities
“may fairly be said to be . . . state actor[s],” or (2) the entities have “acted
together with or . . . obtained significant aid from state officials.”352 The first
option raises the core question. The second option is viable in two scenarios.
First, Fannie and Freddie “obtain[] significant aid from state officials”
when a state power of sale statute requires the participation of a state actor.
Minnesota, for example, requires that a sheriff conduct the foreclosure sale.353
Indeed, the Court found state action in Lugar but not in Flagg Bros.; the
distinguishing fact was that prejudgment attachment in Lugar required
execution by a county sheriff.354 Such official involvement was absent in
Flagg Bros., where the state statute provided for self-help.355 Although some
courts have held that a sheriff’s role in the foreclosure sale is too incidental to
constitute state action,356 a plain reading of Lugar demands that Fannie and
Freddie satisfy due process requirements when they initiate nonjudicial power
of sale foreclosures in states requiring the involvement of a sheriff at the
foreclosure sale.
Second, Fannie and Freddie “act[] together with . . . state officials” because
the FHFA—a federal agency—controls the entities’ operations.357 Further, the
entities “obtain[ed] significant aid from state officials” in the form of Treasury
funding.358 Thus, application of the Lugar test suggests that Fannie and Freddie
must satisfy due process requirements when they initiate nonjudicial
foreclosures, regardless whether the state statute requires the involvement of a
sheriff at the foreclosure sale.
concluded that state action is missing. These decisions have rejected both facial attacks on power of sale
foreclosures, as well as arguments that . . . statutory prescription of foreclosure procedures . . . give rise to state
action when viewed as involvement in the private remedy.”).
352 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
353 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.06 (West 2015).
354 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 927, 941.
355 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978).
356 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 7.27, at 688 (5th ed. 2007); Kathleen Barry, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Maine’s Real Estate Foreclosure Statutes, 32 ME. L. REV. 147, 158 (1980).
357 See supra text accompanying notes 253–55 (discussing the extent to which the FHFA controls the
entities).
358 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; see supra note 232.
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4. Entwinement
Fourth, and most importantly, Brentwood makes plausible that private
conduct could be fairly attributable to the state absent government
authorization, encouragement, or facilitation of the constitutional violation.
Unlike the encouragement or sufficient nexus test, the entwinement analysis
focuses on the relationship between the government and the private actor,
rather than the private action.359 In Brentwood, the Court searched for both
“bottom-up” and “top-down” entwinement.360 Both kinds of entwinement are
present with respect to the FHFA conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie.
In Brentwood, the Court found “bottom-up” entwinement where
government actors appointed a majority of TSSAA legislative council and
board members;361 the FHFA effectively appointed the entire boards of
directors of both Fannie and Freddie at the onset of the conservatorship.362 In
Brentwood, TSSAA funding came from gate receipts at public school sporting
events, allowing the TSSAA to “enjoy[] the schools’ moneymaking capacity as
its own.”363 Similarly, Fannie and Freddie have been kept solvent with
infusions from the U.S. Treasury,364 such that the entities enjoy the
government’s moneymaking capacity as their own. The TSSAA would be
unrecognizable without the membership and financial support of public
officials, who “overwhelmingly perform all but the purely ministerial acts by
which the Association exists.”365 Similarly, Fannie and Freddie owe their very
existence to their congressional charters and subsequent government
intervention.366
The Brentwood Court, in its analysis of “top-down” entwinement, noted
that State Board members serve as members of the legislative council and
board, and that TSSAA employees are eligible for state retirement benefits.367
The FHFA conservatorship evinces even stronger “top-down” entwinement
with the entities. First, the Director of the FHFA controls all litigation

359

See supra discussion preceding note 186.
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary School Athl. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298–300 (2001); supra
note 167.
361 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298–99.
362 See supra discussion preceding note 282.
363 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 299.
364 See supra note 290.
365 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300.
366 See supra discussion preceding note 328.
367 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300.
360
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concerning Fannie and Freddie.368 Second, the Director may limit the
compensation of Fannie’s and Freddie’s executive officers to amounts
reasonably comparable with analogous public institutions, and may withhold
compensation entirely while it determines the reasonableness of
compensation.369 Third, the Director establishes regulatory standards relating
to a variety of conduct: adequacy of internal audit systems; management of
interest rate risk exposure; management of market risk; management of asset
and investment portfolio growth; and “such other operational and management
standards as the Director determines to be appropriate.”370 The FHFA
accomplishes these goals through the issuance of directives to Fannie and
Freddie.371
The entwinement analysis looks much like the government control prong of
the Lebron test. The key, however, is that no plausible reading of Brentwood
requires permanence. In Brentwood, the Court found persuasive that 84% of
TSSAA members were public schools;372 nowhere did the Court indicate that
its finding of state action was contingent on public schools perpetually
dominating TSSAA membership. Thus, the entwinement analysis avoids the
permanence requirement articulated in Herron. Notably, the plaintiff in Herron
argued that the government “is so entwined with Fannie Mae as to have created
a public entity subject to constitutional restrictions.”373 The Herron court’s
analysis of the entwinement question consisted of three sentences:
Brentwood did not change the law of conservatorship and
receivership. As described above, a conservator or receiver steps into
the shoes of the private entity—it assumes the private status of the
entity. Fannie Mae was a private entity; when FHFA took over as
conservator of Fannie Mae, it stepped into Fannie Mae’s private
role.374

Roisman argues that the Herron court misunderstood the effect of
conservatorship:
The case on which the Herron court relied for its “shoes”
metaphor . . . .

368
369
370
371
372
373
374

12 U.S.C. § 4513(c) (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 4518(a), (c) (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 4513(a) (2012).
See supra notes 284–91.
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298.
Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87, 96 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id. (citations omitted).
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. . . does not stand for the proposition that when the FDIC—or any
other federal entity—is a receiver, the federal entity becomes a
private actor for all purposes. Quite to the contrary, Supreme Court
decisions that describe the FDIC as stepping into the shoes of an
insolvent entity hold that federal, not state, law controls in some
situations and make clear that constitutional claims always lie against
the receiver.375

No case citing Herron has considered the entwinement standard. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the Herron court’s conclusory treatment of the Brentwood
analysis would enjoy the precedential effect of its Lebron analysis, even
among lower courts within the Sixth Circuit. However, as noted in the
Brentwood dissent, the entwinement test is considerably broader than previous
state action analyses espoused by the Court.376 Courts may be reluctant to
extend the entwinement analysis in the context of Fannie and Freddie. And
because state action is highly fact-intensive, even if the FHFA conservatorship
of Fannie and Freddie evinces the level of entwinement found in Brentwood,
the inquiry is not over. Brentwood provided that no one set of circumstances is
“absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against
attributing activity to the government.”377
C. An Exception to State Action?
Reluctance to find state action in the context of nonjudicial foreclosure
might suggest an emerging exception to the state action doctrine. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals expressed an unwillingness to find state action in the
context of nonjudicial foreclosure in Warren v. Government National
Mortgage Ass’n.378 The Eighth Circuit held that Ginnie was not a federal actor
susceptible to due process claims.379 The case has received sharp criticism, and
rightfully so: Ginnie is wholly owned by the federal government, operates
under federal government authority, and serves exclusively governmental
purposes.380 Analyzed under Lebron, Ginnie “is certain to be considered a
federal actor for Fifth Amendment purposes, thereby invalidating Warren.”381

375
376
377
378
379
380
381

Roisman, supra note 6, at 189–90 (emphasis added).
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 295–96 (majority opinion).
611 F.2d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1233.
See supra notes 200–02.
Blegen, supra note 275, at 445–46.

EYE GALLEYSPROOFS2

152

9/21/2015 11:53 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:107

However, some scholars suggest that decisions like Warren, and perhaps
Herron, are not a misapplication of state action tests, but rather an exception to
the general doctrine. Professors Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman interpret the
court as suggesting that even the United States can act in a proprietary or
commercial, as opposed to governmental, fashion and that foreclosure of
mortgages can be classified as proprietary or commercial activity.382 Professor
Frank Alexander has termed this argument the “market participant
exception,”383 familiar to the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause.384
The “countervailing interest” language from Brentwood could be used to
effectively carve a “market participant” exception from the entwinement
analysis. Such a reading could reconcile the holdings of Warren and Herron
with those of Lebron and Brentwood. However, the “countervailing interest”
should not be used to carve a market participant exception. The Court gave no
indication in Lebron or, more recently, Department of Transportation v. Ass’n
of American Railroads, that an important government interest may trump a
finding of state action.385 If, however, courts decide that government action in
the secondary mortgage market is simply too important a function to require
the strictures of due process, an explicit exception to the state action doctrine
would be preferable to the misapplication of pre-existing state action tests.
CONCLUSION
The passage of HERA and placement of Fannie and Freddie into FHFA
conservatorship marked a dramatic corporate restructuring that raises
constitutional questions. One such question is whether the conservatorship
transformed Fannie and Freddie into state actors, such that the entities must
satisfy due process requirements when they initiate nonjudicial foreclosures.
The importance of this question is difficult to overstate. Thousands of
homeowners have received constitutionally deficient notice and have been
denied the opportunity for a hearing because many nonjudicial foreclosure
statutes require mere notice by publication.

382

NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 7.28, at 690.
Alexander, supra note 51, at 362–64.
384 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 63, § 11.9, at 246–47 (discussing the market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause).
385 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232–33 (2015) (“[I]n its joint issuance of the metrics and standards with the FRA,
Amtrak acted as a governmental entity for purposes of the Constitution’s separation of powers provisions. And
that exercise of governmental power must be consistent with the design and requirements of the Constitution,
including those provisions relating to the separation of powers.” (emphasis added)).
383
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Homeowners deserve more. The Constitution guarantees homeowners the
right to notice, reasonably calculated to apprise them of an impending
foreclosure, and an opportunity to be heard. However, the right to due process
is without a remedy unless the foreclosing entity is a state actor. The good
news for homeowners is that the plain language of Lebron and Brentwood
suggests that Fannie and Freddie are state actors. The bad news is that cases
like Herron and Mik have held otherwise. Courts in such cases have either
misapplied precedent or created an implicit exception to the state action tests.
Consequently, courts can harmonize state action cases like Lebron and
Brentwood with cases like Herron and Mik in two ways. The first—and
doctrinally consistent—course of action would be to overrule cases like
Herron and Mik. The second would be to create an explicit market participant
exception for government action in the secondary mortgage market. Such an
exception, while of cold comfort to homeowners, would at least reconcile an
increasingly inconsistent body of law.
Although doctrinally aberrant, such an exception is not unreasonable.
Determining that Fannie and Freddie are state actors would impose costly
procedural hurdles on government-funded entities still recovering from
financial collapse. Safeguarding the health of the secondary mortgage market
is a legitimate government interest, but it is not without significant cost. Courts
must consider whether homeowners’ due process rights are too high a price to
pay for protecting the secondary mortgage market. To eschew the question is
to misapply precedent and confound an already conceptually muddy doctrine.
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